Why Some Democrats Cross the Aisle to End a government shutdown
- Kimi

- 1 day ago
- 2 min read

When a shutdown drags on, the political incentives for some Democrats to vote with Republicans are straightforward: the public tends to fault the side seen as running the government or driving the negotiation—so ending the impasse rarely carries heavy political risk for the minority party. In the current 2025 shutdown, a Washington Post/ABC News/Ipsos survey found that more Americans blame the president and congressional Republicans (45%) than Democrats (33%), a pattern that lowers the penalty for Democrats who back a reopening deal.
This “blame asymmetry” isn’t new. During the 2018–2019 shutdown, Post/ABC polling recorded a clear tilt against the White House and GOP (e.g., 53% blamed Trump and Republicans vs. 29–34% Democrats in January 2019). In the 2013 standoff, a Post/ABC measure likewise found more blame aimed at Republicans than at President Obama. The through‑line is that the party perceived as leading government—or as the prime mover of the confrontation—tends to shoulder more responsibility in the public mind.
That calculus helps explain why a bloc of Senate Democrats broke with party leaders this week to move a shutdown deal forward. Their votes cleared the first 60‑vote hurdle on a House‑passed funding measure, positioning Congress to end the closure and reopen agencies. The Democrats who crossed—among them Dick Durbin (IL), Tim Kaine (VA), John Fetterman (PA), Catherine Cortez Masto (NV), Jacky Rosen (NV), Jeanne Shaheen (NH), and Maggie Hassan (NH), along with independent Angus King (ME)—framed the vote as minimizing harm to federal workers and safeguarding programs like SNAP while separate fights continue over expiring health‑care subsidies.
Crossing the aisle can also flip the news narrative. By voting to restore government services, Democrats can project pragmatism and shift the spotlight to Republican divisions and strategy—especially when polling already shows the public attributing more responsibility to the GOP side. At the same time, surveys underscore that many Americans still spread blame broadly, which further diffuses the political cost for Democrats who support a stopgap to reopen.
Of course, there are intraparty risks. Progressive Democrats and some strategists argue that accepting a bare‑bones deal surrenders leverage on core priorities (in 2025, the centerpiece is extending Affordable Care Act tax credits). That tension surfaced immediately after the procedural vote, with visible backlash toward Democrats who supported advancing the compromise.
Historically, the political damage from shutdowns has fallen more heavily on the side perceived as precipitating them. In 2013, for instance, congressional approval sank to a Gallup‑record 9% and Republican favorability plunged, a reminder that prolonged closures can sour public views—particularly of the party seen as responsible. For Democrats, helping to reopen the government can thus look like both good governance and sound risk management.
Bottom line: When polls show the governing party taking more of the heat, Democratic lawmakers have a rational incentive to end a shutdown even if the resulting deal is imperfect. They reduce harm to constituents, appear constructive, and—crucially—do so with relatively modest political downside while leaving space to continue substantive policy fights once the lights are back on.



