Ukraine’s Drone Strikes Cut Russia’s Refining Capacity by 38%

Ukraine’s Drone Strikes Cut Russia’s Refining Capacity by 38%

Where does the data come from? Why is it "38%"?

The "38%" figure at the end of September isn't a long-term average, but rather a snapshot of idle capacity at a specific point in time. Based on Siala's daily inventory of equipment status, RBC estimates that approximately 338,000 tons/day of primary processing capacity was not operating on September 28. Siala also estimates that approximately 555,000 tons/day of capacity was in operation at the time, indicating a rare year-long high in idle capacity.

Looking longer term, monthly statistics for August show a record 6.4 million tons of offline capacity per month , roughly half of which was caused by drone strikes. This translates to approximately 17% of the nation's refining capacity being offline that month. This is a monthly summary compiled by Reuters based on industry data.

Therefore, the "38%" figure can be understood as the peak of attacks and maintenance at a certain point in time. On a monthly basis, drone attacks pushed the already heavy maintenance workload to its limit , increasing the overall offline rate.

Where does a hit hurt the most? — The principle of striking from the center

Ukraine is using long-range, one-shot attack drones (OWA-UAVs) to systematically target bottleneck equipment at refineries, including the atmospheric distillation unit (CDU) , vacuum distillation unit (VDU) , hydrocracker, and reformer. The downtime of any one of these units can cripple the entire production line, requiring long repair times and difficult replacement parts. In late August, Reuters, citing two industry sources, reported that a CDU-6 unit at a large refinery, representing approximately 60% of the plant's capacity, had ignited. This type of successful "heart attack" is the key to the surge in overall shutdown rates.

Key hit samples:

• After being hit by a Ukrainian drone in early August, the Ryazan refinery operator notified pipeline companies that August crude oil inflows would be reduced by approximately 60% compared to plan . The refinery is a major supplier of oil to the Moscow region.

• Samara-Volga belt and southern Russian coastal clusters : In August statistics, plants in Samara Oblast, Volgograd, the area around the port of Ust-Luga, and several plants in the south were all on the list of affected plants, resulting in a cumulative 17% of production capacity being offline that month .

A broader operational assessment shows that the Ukrainian army is using low-cost, long-range, and saturated disposable drones to create a " precise and large-scale " strike signature, specifically targeting high-value, difficult-to-repair nodes, thereby exerting sustained pressure on Russian military and industrial logistics.

Why Can't We Defend It? — The Dual Dilemma of Wide-Area Air Defense and Maintenance Bottlenecks

Extensive scope : Western Russia's refineries are highly concentrated and dispersed, making comprehensive coverage difficult with limited close defense and electronic warfare resources. Slow repairs : Damaged equipment often requires extended unplanned maintenance . At the end of September, Russian media reported that scheduled maintenance periods were being moved or extended, further increasing the overall downtime .

Data implications : Offline capacity in August was 6.4 million tons/month ( 65% higher than the established maintenance plan), with drones accounting for approximately 48% of these outages. Even plants that were not affected will find it difficult to fully replenish these capacity.

Chain reaction: From domestic "oil shortage" to changes in export structure

• Supply gap : In September, Russia's domestic gasoline market saw a monthly gap of about 20% (about 400,000 tons ); retail outlets suspended sales and implemented purchase restrictions.

• Sales restrictions in Crimea and other places : The occupied territory of Crimea is allocating a limited number of cars per vehicle, and shortages are also reported in many places in the mainland.

• Policy Response : The Russian government extended its gasoline export ban and imposed new restrictions on diesel exports to prioritize domestic demand.

• Forced imports : To fill the gap, Russia has recently increased imports from Belarus and is discussing importing gasoline from China, South Korea, and Singapore , and is considering reducing/exempting some import tariffs.

• Crude oil outflows increased : refinery closures diverted more crude oil to export pipelines and seaports; crude oil loadings from Russia's three major western ports (Primorsk, Ust-Luga, and Novorossiysk) increased by 25% in September compared to August .

Market research also points out that although crude oil exports have increased, due to internal logistics and transshipment bottlenecks , the increased crude oil exports are still difficult to fully offset the output lost at the refining end.

Not a one-shot kill: The elasticity of numbers and the durability of their effects

It's important to emphasize that 38% represents a peak at a certain point in time . As early as May 2024 , US defense intelligence estimated that Ukrainian attacks temporarily disrupted approximately 14% of Russia's refining capacity. By August 2025 , Reuters, citing LSEG data, reported that the impact was approximately 17% . This discrepancy reflects the lag between the tempo of attacks and the recovery from repairs , as well as the overlapping effects of maintenance seasons.

At the same time, industry sources also pointed out that factories that were not attacked will temporarily increase their loads to partially offset the suspensions; even so, the suspensions in September still set a record high in the past few months , indicating that the Ukrainian army's continued long-range strikes are having a cumulative effect.

Why is Ukraine's attack becoming more and more accurate?

• Platform and Tactical Upgrades : Advances in the OWA-UAV's range, navigation jamming resistance, and warhead design enable it to penetrate deep into Russian territory, hit key locations, and penetrate point defenses using a multi-axis/multi-wave approach.

• Target selection is more "economical" : Prioritize attacking equipment such as CDU/VDU , "a few of which can strangle the entire factory," so that the limited number of bullets can achieve the maximum stopping effect; multiple cases have proven this "bottleneck attack" strategy.

• Wide scope, limited manpower : Russia has to guard dozens of refineries, ports and pipeline hubs simultaneously every night , which is increasingly straining its resources and costs.

After "38%": The Next Steps in the Battlefield and Energy War

As of early October, mainstream Western media, citing local Russian data, still viewed the nearly 40% suspension as a valid indicator of the current crisis. Meanwhile, the Russian government was forced to extend or increase export restrictions, import gasoline, and discuss tariff reductions, highlighting the strain on domestic demand . Ukraine, on the other hand, claimed to have targeted 21 of Russia's 38 refineries , indicating that the frequency and coverage of its in-depth crackdown continues to expand.

Beyond the energy dimension, this "drone versus refinery" offensive and defensive battle is also rewriting strategic support: Compared to expensive long-range missiles, inexpensive long-range drones use dispersed and sustained pressure to economically and psychologically deplete an adversary's repair capabilities, spare parts inventory, and social resilience . This is precisely the situation Russia faces in the second half of 2025.

To sum it up in one sentence : Ukraine used precise, cheap, and persistent drone strikes, specifically targeting the bottleneck units of refineries, causing Russia to be unbalanced on three fronts: repair, defense, and supply . That's why we saw that glaring number at the end of September - 38% .